Ecuador: ‘Criminal logic moves faster than governmental logic’

We spoke with Glaeldys González Calanche, fellow of the International Crisis Group's Latin America programme, and delved into the factors that have triggered the recent wave of violence in Ecuador. She explained that addressing these challenges requires a comprehensive response that takes into account both the security aspects but also the underlying causes of the crisis, including social inequality and corruption, as well as the importance of international cooperation to confront transnational criminal networks.

 

Text: Eva Fernández   Illustration: Sergio Ortiz Borbolla 

Expert Glaeldys González Calanche sheds light on the complex criminal puzzle that Ecuador has become. She reflects on  the impact of the penitentiary crisis, the rise of drug trafficking and the endemic corruption that has shaken a country once considered ‘the island of peace’.

We spoke with Glaeldys González Calanche, fellow of the International Crisis Group’s Latin America programme, and delved into the factors that have triggered the recent wave of violence in Ecuador. She explained that addressing these challenges requires a comprehensive response that takes into account both the security aspects but also the underlying causes of the crisis, including social inequality and corruption, as well as the importance of international cooperation to confront transnational criminal networks.

Eva Fernández Martín (EFM): What have been the triggers of the recent wave of violence in Ecuador?

Glaeldys González Calanche (GGC): There are three key elements: the first is the new role that Ecuador has acquired in the global drug market, the second has to do with the level of fragmentation and atomisation of the Ecuadorian criminal world, and the third is the prison crisis.

Due to its location, Ecuador has historically been a transit country for drugs, but a decade ago it began to acquire a more important role in the supply chain, particularly in terms of storage and processing. This happened in the context of a boom in coca crop production in Colombia that peaked in 2021 and, internally, improvements in road infrastructure, which connects the whole country very well, something that criminal groups see as very positive. In addition, there is the issue of the financial system, dollarisation in Ecuador and very low levels of investigation.

The criminal world, particularly Colombian groups from the border and also from Mexico, see this as a favourable space and begin to enter and link up with local Ecuadorian groups.

In addition, internally, the assassination, at the end of 2020, of the leader of Los Chorneros, alias Rasquiña was an important milestone. Since the 1990s, the Chonneros had been the main group controlling the illegal drug market. They worked in alliance with smaller groups that helped them to carry out certain tasks, such as contract killings. This kind of harmony broke down when alias Rasquiña was killed and the dispute over the leadership of the group began. In addition, the smaller factions began to dispute territories with the Choneros, spaces within the prisons, strategic zones for drug trafficking, such as entrances to rivers and access to ports. All of this without a state structure that can respond.

This has been a cross-cutting issue in the security crisis because the economy is very weak and operations that require keeping the armed forces on the streets require large investment, while the authorities say there is no money.

EFM: Prison dynamics have played a very important role in this context…

GGC: Prisons are the centres of operation from which these groups manage the business of organised crime and where they can recruit members. They are very important for all that they signify and because they continue to be a space where the state has no control.

This is where the first break and atomisation of the organisations took place. When the Choneros fragmented, the dispute for control began. Controlling the pavilions also means controlling some part of the internal business, which translates into what happens outside, and also having space for them to feed their ranks.

EFM: What should be done about the prison issue?

GGC: What is needed here is to take back control of the prisons, to tackle widespread institutional corruption, particularly of the SNAI, which is completely plagued, mainly  the lower level officials, because they receive very low salaries and already in the prisons they are forced by the groups to be permissive, because they and their families are subject to reprisals.

There are also many infrastructure failures, especially in terms of technology. Almost none of these prisons have metal scanners, so any amount of weaponry can get in, including heavy weapons that even come from the armed forces.

Then there is the issue of overcrowding. Mass incarceration can have the opposite effect to that which is sought, and another thing that is more socially oriented is the lack of rehabilitation programmes, of training people in prisons in some kind of trade, so that they do not fall back into the ranks of criminal organisations.

EFM: What role does the adverse economic context play in criminal dynamics?

GGC: This has been a cross-cutting issue in the security crisis because the economy is very weak and operations that require keeping the armed forces on the streets require large investment, while the authorities say there is no money.

This government was already facing a fiscal deficit, the weather situation has affected them a lot in recent weeks. So these are all problems that are accumulating and could be a major obstacle to making progress on the security proposals. The government has talked a lot about what they are proposing is an integral policy, which is not only this militarised approach, but the lack of resources means that they will not be able to make progress in the other economic and social fields, such as addressing the root causes of violence.

There are other issues that need to be addressed at the same time and that are not purely security-related, such as strengthening the judicial apparatus, which has been weakened by corruption, which has allowed organised crime to enter. We also need to strengthen the general infrastructure, the intelligence agencies and the social and economic policies to prevent more people from falling into poverty.

 

EFM: You mentioned corruption as another key element of the current situation?

GGC: Corruption is an issue that has been affecting the country for decades, although we have seen some significant developments since the end of last year that are being led by the prosecutor’s office to bring these schemes to light.

Corruption is widespread in the state apparatus and the loss of prestige it generates has served to give support to “tough on crime” policies, including tolerance of human rights violations. “People can’t take it anymore, this is the only way,” this narrative has taken hold.

On the other hand, a person who comes to you and says, look, this is going to take years and a lot of effort is also needed in social investment, especially in communities that are completely unprotected. That discourse is not going to catch on. The fight against corruption is also a long-term struggle.

There is also the issue of education, training, specialisation in this, which is very important, and this is also where international cooperation comes in, supporting these local courts, these judges, and this will also generate the creation of more teams and more trained people.

EFM: With respect to the current strategy, what has worked and what hasn’t during these three months?

GGC: So far efforts have concentrated on reducing homicide rates and yes there has been a slight reduction, but not everywhere – Guayas, for example, is one of the areas where there has not been much improvement, which has shown the limits of these measures.

The other thing I am seeing is that criminal groups are moving to other areas where there was no violence and where they had no presence, adjusting to the (new) conditions. I find it very worrying that there has been a lack of attention to other types of crime that affect the community more directly and go unnoticed, and which have seen an exaggerated increase in recent months, such as extortion and kidnapping. Criminal logic moves much faster than governmental logic.

I don’t see that the measures have a long-term vision. I am also concerned that although they are designed for times of emergency and critical situations, they will become a permanent state of affairs, with limitations on rights. There have already been many alarms, especially in these raids that have been carried out and in the context of prisons, but there is a lot of concern that this will later become a more general problem. Also that these special powers that have been granted to all the armed forces and the police can act with impunity without facing prosecution due to the exceptional nature of the context.

EFM: What role do other countries play in Ecuador’s situation?

GGC: Regional cooperation both to address the Ecuadorian issue and to curb organised crime and the violence that is linked to it is essential. Ecuador is currently looking a lot at Colombia, its neighbour, with whom there has been progress in terms of military cooperation, and that seems to me to be very important, especially in terms of information exchange so that agencies can work together, and above all on the issue of border security.

The issue of Mexico, however, can be seen as an obstacle in these broader efforts, especially considering what that country represents in all these transnational drug trafficking networks. What these breakdowns do is to hinder the consolidation of a direct line to address the problem jointly in terms of information exchange and customs issues.

The interview has been summarised and edited for clarity.