Mexico’s Jalisco Cartel New Generation is Unique

Mexico’s Jalisco Cartel New Generation is Unique. This is Why.

The Jalisco Cartel New Generation is one of the most violent crime groups in Mexico, and the world. But this was not always the case. In the first of a three-part series, author Chris Dalby explores how a family of rich avocado farmers transformed into a brutal criminal syndicate.

Text: Chris Dalby  Ilustration: Josefina Salomón

A wealthy family clan, avocados, a leader who called himself “Maradona”, tons of cocaine, strategic alliances, controversial love affairs, methamphetamine and a sophisticated business network. 

The story of the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación, one of the dominant and most violent forces controlling Mexico’s criminal landscape, has it all.

But the CJNG was not always this violent.

In this first of a three-part series for In.Visibles, Chris Dalby, author of “CJNG – A Quick Guide to Mexico’s Deadliest Cartel”, a book published by World of Crime, explores how a family of rich avocado farmers transformed into a brutal criminal syndicate.

The Hills of Michoacán

The Valencia family’s rise began with their success in the avocado industry in the state of Michoacán throughout much of the 20th century. With extensive plantations around towns like Aguililla and Uruapan, they capitalized on the region’s fertile lands and strategic location, which provided access to Mexico City, Pacific ports, and highways leading north. longside their legal avocado trade, however, the Valencias expanded into illicit markets, planting marijuana and opium poppy on their farms as early as the 1950s.

They gradually became known as reliable providers of these crops to larger criminal groups, further north, especially in the state of Sinaloa – and grew increasingly wealthy. However, US import laws prevented them from expanding past the border.

In the 1990s, two significant events played in their favour. Firstly, the US, Mexico and Canada signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), allowing Mexican avocados to be exported to the US without barriers. Secondly, Pablo Escobar and his infamous Medellín Cartel in Colombia needed a new connection to receive shipments of cocaine and smuggle them into the US. The Valencias were chosen.

Through their control of strategic drug routes along Mexico’s Pacific coast, and particularly their access to the key port of Lázaro Cárdenas, the Valencias became integral players in the international cocaine trade. By the late 1990s, they were reportedly handling up to 30 tons of cocaine a month, moving shipments from Colombia to the United States.

The family had become one of the most influential criminal clans in Mexico. They needed a new name. The year 2000 was looming large and their leader at the time, Armando Valencia Cornelio, alias “Maradona,” chose the name “Milenio Cartel.”

The Valencias had never faced an enemy as brutal as the Zetas. By late 2003, hundreds had died. Worse, Maradona was arrested in a military operation.

The Zetas and Exile to Jalisco

Maradona was a charismatic figure and quickly sought alliances across Mexico to allow marijuana, heroin and cocaine to reach the US border. To do so, he entrusted a Milenio associate, Carlos Rosales Mendoza, to broker ties with the Gulf Cartel, another powerful clan which controlled much of Mexico’s border with Texas.

Initially, this worked wonders. Rosales was the perfect go-between. He became close friends with the Gulf Cartel boss, Osiel Cárdenas Guillén. He also fell in love with Inés Oseguera, cousin of Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, a top lieutenant in the Milenio Cartel.

But this did not last long. Inés began an affair with Maradona himself.

Rosales, consumed by jealousy and anger, vowed revenge on the Valencias, marking the start of a deadly campaign. Backed by the Gulf Cartel, Rosales turned against the Milenio Cartel, promising bounties for anyone who could kill a member of the Valencia family, including their dogs. This conflict quickly escalated in 2002 when Cárdenas Guillén unleashed his elite hit squad, the Zetas, on the Valencias’ operations in Michoacán.

The Valencias had never faced an enemy as brutal as the Zetas. By late 2003, hundreds had died. Worse, Maradona was arrested in a military operation.

The remnants of the Milenio Cartel went into exile, fleeing north to the state of Jalisco, and agreeing to work for Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán and his Sinaloa Cartel, already the largest criminal group in Mexico.

The Flight to Jalisco and the Matazetas

After their retreat to Jalisco, the Valencias leaned heavily on their alliance with the Sinaloa Cartel. El Chapo placed them under the leadership of his wife’s uncle, Ignacio “Nacho” Coronel, the Sinaloa Cartel’s key operator in Guadalajara, the state’s capital. Coronel, known for his methamphetamine expertise, was instrumental in keeping the Milenio Cartel intact. His guidance allowed the Valencias to continue producing synthetic drugs and laundering money, skills critical to the Sinaloa Cartel’s operations.

The Valencias did not forget their blood feud with the Zetas, an enemy they shared with their new patrons. This gave rise to the Matazetas (Zeta Killers), a strike force composed of Milenio and Sinaloa members. The Matazetas were notorious for their ruthless campaigns against the Zetas, killing dozens of alleged members at a time. The Valencias, under Coronel’s guidance, helped the Sinaloa Cartel seecure strategic drug routes and chemical precursor imports, strengthening their position in Mexico’s lucrative meth trade.

However, the fragile balance of power began to unravel in 2010. First, the Milenio Cartel suffered a major blow with the arrests of Óscar Orlando and Juan Nava Valencia, known as “El Lobo” and “El Tigre,” two key leaders holding the cartel together. Their capture left a power vacuum within the organization, just as Ignacio Coronel, the crucial stabilizing force, was killed in a violent shootout with Mexican marines in July 2010.

With Coronel’s death and the arrests of its top leaders, the Milenio Cartel began to fragment. This vacuum created an opportunity for Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, alias “Mencho,” to rise. Mencho was the first leader to not be a Valencia by name, even though his wife and best friends both belonged to the family. 

Mencho capitalized on the chaos, laying the groundwork for the creation  of the Jalisco Cartel New Generation (CJNG). 

Mencho kick-started a new strategy, focusing on synthetic drugs, especially meth, as the backbone of the CJNG’s income, but also allowing local commanders to make whatever profits they could locally.

Thirteen years on, his control is uncontested. Even though Mencho has not appeared in public for years, leading to speculation about his death, the group remains loyal to him. His modus operandi of using violence as a constant tool of oppression and maximizing profits.

Over the course of the next decade, Mencho would guide the CJNG on a course to exploit every possible criminal economy and fight any group standing up to them. By early 2024, World of Crime found that the CJNG was involved in conflicts with at least 13 medium to large-sized criminal groups across Mexico, and skirmishes with many more smaller gangs.

Why this level of violence? To protect one of the most diversified and sophisticated criminal empires built in the country. 

Here is a summary of the main criminal economies the CJNG has developed over more than a decade:

Methamphetamine

Methamphetamine is at the core of the CJNG’s criminal empire, both in Mexico and the United States. The cartel’s deep roots in meth production trace back to the early 2000s, with the Colima Cartel laying the foundation for meth production in western Mexico. When the Colima Cartel collapsed, the CJNG filled the void and rapidly expanded meth production, primarily in Jalisco and Michoacán, where they could exploit proximity to Pacific ports like Manzanillo and Lázaro Cárdenas to import chemical precursors from China​.

The CJNG’s strategy focused on making meth production a community-driven process, allowing smaller local groups to operate meth labs and sell the drug back to the cartel. This decentralized approach allowed the CJNG to dominate meth production, controlling over 50% of the meth labs found in Mexico between 2006 and 2018​. By 2021, meth seizures at the Mexico-California border had risen by 300%, with the CJNG contributing to the majority of the supply​. The cartel’s expertise in producing high-purity meth further solidified its dominance in the market. By 2012, the purity of Mexican meth had reached 93%, up from 38% just five years earlier​. This unprecedented efficiency gave the CJNG a near-monopoly in meth production.

Fentanyl

The fentanyl trade has rapidly become another critical component of the CJNG’s financial empire. Initially lagging behind other cartels like the Sinaloa Cartel, the CJNG quickly pivoted to fentanyl production as demand for synthetic opioids surged in the US from 2016 onward. The cartel leveraged its meth production infrastructure and port access to source fentanyl precursors from China, establishing itself as a key player in this deadly market. Fentanyl is not only trafficked directly but is also pressed into fake prescription pills and mixed with other opioids, a tactic that has increased both demand and mortality rates​.

Fentanyl’s appeal lies in its potency. A single kilogram of fentanyl, costing between $3,000 and $4,000, can be stretched into 16 to 24 kilograms of drug product, yielding upwards of $1.3 million in street value​. The CJNG’s expertise in synthetic drug production, combined with its established smuggling routes, has positioned it to challenge the Sinaloa Cartel for dominance in the U.S. fentanyl market.

Cocaine

While the CJNG is not involved in the cultivation of cocaine, the cartel has established itself as a formidable trafficker of the drug. The cartel’s involvement in the cocaine trade dates back to the early days of the Milenio Cartel, which forged partnerships with Colombian groups like the Medellín Cartel. The CJNG has continued to nurture these relationships, now working closely with Colombian groups like the Gulf Clan and the National Liberation Army (ELN)​, as well as Ecuadorian groups like the Lobos. 

The CJNG has increasingly turned to migrant smuggling as another source of income. Taking advantage of Mexico’s position between Central America and the United States and the desperation of people fleeing violence and poverty.

Oil Theft (Huachicoleo)

Oil theft, known as huachicoleo in Mexico, has become a key criminal economy for the CJNG in recent years. The cartel has exploited Mexico’s extensive oil pipeline system, siphoning off millions of dollars’ worth of fuel, and selling it on the black market. The CJNG has built a vast fuel theft network, especially around the states of Veracruz, Puebla, and Guanajuato, where pipelines are easily accessible. This illicit trade not only deprives Mexico of significant government revenue but also funds the CJNG’s broader criminal operations.

The U.S. Department of Treasury has sanctioned CJNG-linked individuals and entities involved in fuel theft, noting that the cartel generates tens of millions of dollars annually from this illegal trade. 

Migrant Smuggling

The CJNG has increasingly turned to migrant smuggling as another source of income. Taking advantage of Mexico’s position between Central America and the United States and the desperation of people fleeing violence and poverty, the cartel has positioned itself along key migration routes, particularly in Chiapas, where it controls the flow of migrants from Guatemala into Mexico. Migrants seeking to reach the U.S. often pay substantial fees to CJNG operatives for safe passage through cartel-controlled territories​.

Migrant smuggling also serves as an additional opportunity for human exploitation. Reports have surfaced that the CJNG often forcibly recruits migrants to work for the cartel, as drug runners, manual labour, and even as gunmen.

Extortion and Money Laundering

The CJNG has also diversified beyond drug trafficking, exploiting alternative criminal economies to strengthen its financial base. Extortion is a key revenue stream, especially in territories where the cartel exerts full control. From local businesses to multinational corporations operating in Mexico, the CJNG has systematized its extortion efforts, demanding protection fees and even exercising economic control over the supply chains of large industries. Cargo truck hijackings have soared across Mexico, but most notably in states controlled by the CJNG such as Jalisco. 

Money laundering is another pillar of the cartel’s financial structure. The CJNG has embedded itself in legitimate industries like construction and real estate, using these as vehicles to clean its illicit earnings. Many of these laundering operations occur in western Mexico, close to the cartel’s meth production hubs, ensuring a steady flow of funds​.

This three-part series is based on Chris Dalby’s book, “CJNG – A Quick Guide to Mexico’s Deadliest Cartel”, published by World of Crime.